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January 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Interim Report to the President by the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, dated December 28, 1962

We have set down the several paragraphs of the subject report followed by our comments.

1. The recommendation of the Board. Great uncertainties about present Soviet efforts in Cuba indicate the necessity of a continuing aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy makers with timely and adequate information to meet the possibility of continuing Soviet confrontation in Cuba. We must resist any tendency towards a let down in our intelligence effort against Cuba in the wake of intelligence successes resulting from our military reconnaissance missions over the island. In making this observation we are mindful that in a quite different atmosphere the Central Intelligence Agency did not mount effective clandestine intelligence collection operations in Cuba for an eight-month period following the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Comment. We agree with the principle stated in the first sentence of the recommendation and the need to continue an aggressive intelligence effort against Cuba. This view was advanced by the Director of Central Intelligence at the meeting of the President's Board on December 7, 1962 and again at the meeting of the Board on December 28. The DCI informed the Board at these meetings that it was important that there be extensive intelligence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba and that efforts to get agents into Cuba were being intensified. It should be noted, however, that in clandestine intelligence operations the allocation of additional manpower and funds to a task, although helpful, does not necessarily assure a corresponding improvement in production or accomplishment.

Since early 1962 the CIA has increased its effort to collect intelligence information on Cuba. The operations for this purpose have been

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conducted vigorously as a matter of urgency. Following the misfortune at the Bay of Pigs, there was a decrease in the clandestine effort against Cuba. Even so, from April 15, 1961 through December 1961 the Clandestine Services of CIA disseminated 608 information reports on Cuba, of which 406 reports came from sources inside Cuba. The Contact Division/OC of CIA disseminated 1764 reports on Cuba during the period April 8 to December 1961. During the period from April 1961 through December 1961, [redacted] resident agents were recruited in Cuba and are still active. In addition, [redacted] resident assets, [redacted] with sub-assets, recruited prior to April 1961, were maintained during this same eight-month period and are still active. There were other recruitments and numerous attempts that failed.

The period of sixty days following the Bay of Pigs invasion was a difficult one for the Agency. The Taylor Committee, composed of General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Allen Dulles, and Admiral Burke, began its survey of the Bay of Pigs operation on April 22 and continued throughout May and June. This Committee took much of the time and effort of precisely those people responsible for Cuban operations, both in Miami and in Washington. There were demands for written papers and documents, as well as personal interviews of key people. Changes in the top echelon of the Agency, anticipated during the summer and implemented in the fall of 1961, had their effect on Cuban operations. While it was generally agreed and understood that our effort to collect information must continue, specific policy guidance was not given to CIA and funds necessary to carry out expanded programs were not approved by higher authority until August 4, 1961.

The newly appointed DCI, following his review of the situation in mid-December 1961, directed that the effort against Cuba be intensified. This led to the establishment, on March 8, 1962, of Task Force W as a separate entity within the Agency for the purpose of mounting a maximum effort, particularly in the collection of information, against Cuba. As of March 8, 1962 the Task Force had a personnel strength in the field and at Headquarters of [redacted]. As of January 1, 1963, the total number of personnel devoting full time to the efforts of the Task Force was [redacted] of this [redacted] were from other agencies and other components of the Agency outside the Clandestine Services. Total financial obligations during fiscal year 1962 were [redacted]. Estimated obligations for fiscal year 1963 totaled [redacted] but now have been scaled to [redacted] with the final figure dependent upon future policy.

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2. The recommendation of the Board. We recommend intensified, hard-hitting efforts to increase our capability for obtaining significant intelligence through clandestine collection operations (espionage). Despite noteworthy intelligence results obtainable through scientific and technical means, we still have as great a need as ever for carefully selected, human-resource espionage operations, professionally executed on the basis of the soundest planning judgments and the most competent target selection processes which the intelligence community can achieve. The Cuban experience is a case in point, for we now have few meaningful espionage assets on the island and without such assets we have little hope of developing the kind and degree of hard intelligence which is required on such critical matters as: a) the plans and intentions of the Soviet Government and the Castro regime for future operations within Cuba or for future operations launched from Cuba against other Latin American countries; b) the alleged concealment of offensive weapons in caves or other locations which are incapable of being probed by technical intelligence means; and c) the actual numbers of Soviet troops in Cuba, their precise deployment, equipments, activities and objectives.

In numerous countries our serious lack of clandestine agent resources is compounded by heavy reliance on the use of [REDACTED] for our intelligence-gathering activities abroad. Again, Cuba provides an important lesson. [REDACTED] 16

[REDACTED] and we still do not have adequate, deep-cover, clandestine agent networks on which to rely. Priority U. S. intelligence requirements in Latin America and elsewhere call for intensive efforts by the appropriate intelligence agencies of the Government to lay the groundwork for deep-cover, clandestine intelligence operations. [REDACTED] 16

Events of the past few years suggest that dramatic advances in advanced intelligence methods such as high altitude and satellite photography have obscured the role of human beings as collection and transmission media, trained and equipped with the most sophisticated technical aids, and supported by essential logistics and communications. We are gravely concerned about the progressive loss of our capability in the field of clandestine intelligence operations and in our view there is a need for the preparation of new plans for the recruiting, training and equipping of agents for comprehensive clandestine intelligence collection, particularly in Latin America.

* The need for clandestine intelligence coverage has been emphasized previously in reports of advisory bodies constituted by the President to review our foreign

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intelligence activities. These advisory groups, which incidentally included some of the members of your present Board, have made specific recommendations on the subject. In 1954 the Doolittle Committee emphasized the need for: a) developing nonofficial cover facilities; b) the placement of "deep-cover sleeper agents" [REDACTED] 16

[REDACTED] c) the creation of a long-range, deep-cover planning system; and d) the promulgation of cover doctrine and procedure. In 1955 the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, noting that "we should today be laying the groundwork for extensive covert operations in every country available to our agents", recommended that "a heavy long-term investment should be made in the preparation of covert agents as eventual sources of high-level intelligence." More recently, in its report of July 2, 1961, your Board recommended that the new Director of Central Intelligence consider the desirability and means of achieving a deeper cover for all clandestine and covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, [REDACTED] 16

[REDACTED] having in mind their replacement by agents under deep cover.

Comment. We agree with the principle of intensifying hard-hitting efforts to increase the production of significant intelligence information through espionage. This we will continue to do on a worldwide basis within the limits of our resources. We strongly support the principle expressed in the second sentence above. We agree that it is important for those responsible for the collection of intelligence information to bear in mind that there is much sorely needed information that cannot be collected by scientific and technical means. Such information is often in the human mind or the written word. Frequently information collected by scientific and technical means must be supplemented by information derived from human sources to interpret it or to give it true significance. As Mr. Helms informed the Board on December 7, 1962, there is an impressive illustration of this interplay of information from technical and human sources in the identification of missiles and their sites in Cuba. Material derived from classic espionage played a vital role in the community's analysis of Soviet missile activities in Cuba last October. Specifically, Soviet TOP SECRET documents acquired by a CIA agent concerning the preparation of R-12 MRBM's for launching, and the layout of sites for such missiles, provided the primary basis for evaluating the degree of completion and the state of readiness of the MRBM's in Cuba. These reports also complemented photo intelligence by providing organizational facts on R-12 units, and identifying specific ground support equipment which appeared in photographs.

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Material from agent operations also helped interpret COMINT relating to Soviet activity in Cuba. Letter-number designations for components of Soviet missiles and their ground support equipment which appear in material supplied by a CIA agent have enabled NSA to identify items being shipped from the USSR to Cuba.

In considering the statement that "we now have few meaningful espionage assets on the island" it should be remembered that meaningful intelligence is obtained not only on the island but elsewhere as well. We do have assets which report on Cuba, such as Cuban diplomats, liaison services, Cuban seamen, and audio operations against Cuban [redacted] all 16 of which are not on the island but do provide meaningful information about events inside Cuba. Among these assets are some that do provide us with insights into the Castro regime's plans and intentions. We have on the island 16 itself over [redacted] resident singleton agents who have been and are providing us with a variety of intelligence information on Cuba. Among these are those agents who furnished the intelligence community with significant reports on aspects of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba last summer, particularly on SAM's, cruise missiles, MIG-21's, IL-28's, and strategic missiles. These agent reports, combined with refugee reports, initially resulted in the targeting for the U-2 flights which identified the SAM's and other weapons and later contributed to the targeting for the U-2 flight of October 14 which 16 discovered the MRBM site at San Cristobal. Today, there are among the more than [redacted] resident agents in Cuba approximately [redacted] agent sources 16 with a capability of providing significant information on military developments and approximately [redacted] with access to significant political information. We 16 do not have sources with complete access to the "plans and intentions" of the Castro regime. It must be remembered, however, that agents inside Cuba are operating within a classic denied area with ever-increasing police controls and where Cubans are largely excluded from Soviet military installations. We will never be satisfied that we have a sufficient number of agent resources on the island of Cuba; however, the quantity of agents is not the most difficult problem. Reaching the targets within a country organized as Cuba is now organized is the greatest difficulty.

The second paragraph of this recommendation appears to confuse American operatives under nonofficial cover with sources under deep cover who can survive and report after the severance of diplomatic relations.

There is an inclination by some critics of the current clandestine effort to consider an increase in nonofficial cover [redacted] 16

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[REDACTED] In those areas where nonofficial cover may provide legality for an agent's residence in the area and concealment of his ultimate objectives, it still may not give him access to designated targets. Unless it does, nonofficial cover is unproductive. The identification of a target and access to it through a viable cover instrument is an essential combination in the employment of nonofficial cover.

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[REDACTED]

No sweeping or general conclusion can be applied to a relationship of official cover to nonofficial cover, except in those few places where there is relatively a free choice between the two. But since there are not very many of those, each country must be considered as a problem in itself. The augmentation of nonofficial cover assets lies in closer examination of the operational possibilities of nonofficial cover in each individual station to insure that it is employed in instances where it is available and will enable the representative to do his job or accomplish his task. We must start with a consideration of our objective in a given area and determine if we can reasonably expect to reach it through nonofficial cover.

To this end, some months ago the CIA initiated a worldwide planning program. Each station and base chief was asked to evaluate his operations, present and projected, to determine the most efficient balance between staff under official cover and staff under nonofficial cover, to be achieved, as a target date, five years hence. Practically all of these plans have now been received in Washington and are in process of Headquarters evaluation. It was clear even before the planning was undertaken, that certain stations needed seasoned officers under nonofficial cover and that there was a big void in the category of the officer who, as a young man, might locate under nonofficial cover in a given community and spend the better part of his career serving both the purposes of his cover and CIA.

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
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During the past year there has been a gratifying improvement on both counts. These programs will continue to have high priority and be the subject of intensive efforts.



The best possibility of attaining intelligence assets after a break in diplomatic relations or a hostile takeover lies in the creation and maintenance of a dormant skeletal network prior thereto, with activation on signal from without at some future date. This plan has actually been followed in  17
 in certain  areas and it has proved to be 11
burdensome and very costly in terms of both manpower and money. CIA does not have the capability in addition to its current operations to create and maintain this type of staybehind on a very large scale. This does not mean that nothing should be done in those cases where a hostile takeover or a break in relations appear probable. Efforts to penetrate the communist apparatus and communist cadres should be heavily augmented. Other minority groups should also be penetrated. Individuals who have not been active in either espionage or national politics and who might survive the takeover should be identified, cleared and even approached at a given point in the developing situation. All in all, more should and can be done in those cases. The answer to the problem of the  however, 16


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[REDACTED]

An informed current estimate is that the Soviet Union employs worldwide under official cover more than 1300 operations officers (known or suspect KGB, 652; known or suspect GRU, 328; known or suspect RIS (Service unidentified), 312). There are about 370 Soviet permanent officials serving in New York City and Washington, D. C. Of these 370 permanent Soviet "officials", there are 140 positively identified intelligence officers and 33 who are suspects. In addition, there are hundreds of Soviets who visit the United States with the U.S. General Assembly or with other Soviet delegations and groups. Almost without exception, these groups contain Soviet intelligence officers under official cover. While the Soviet official representation in the U.S. has included 140 individuals known to be engaged in intelligence activities the CIA has never had more than [REDACTED] in duty in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Overseas, the present total of American operatives under non-official cover is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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There has not been a progressive loss of our capability in the field of clandestine intelligence operations. On the contrary our capability has increased. As an example during the last half of 1960, [REDACTED] sources produced 23,034 positive information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services of CIA. During the last half of 1962, [REDACTED] sources produced 22,256 positive information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services of the CIA. The smaller number of reports during the second period resulted from a concerted effort to reduce marginal reporting and encourage fewer but better reports.

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On the situation in Latin America, the South America Assessment Team in its report of January 10, 1962 stated that in general CIA had established a healthy foundation for the collection of intelligence information;

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that this base should be retained; that what was needed from then on was expansion, strengthening and refinement of capabilities in various fields of activity. During the past year CIA has made progress in expanding, strengthening and refining its capability in the clandestine collection of intelligence information in Latin America. CIA has opened new stations in

During the past year,

CIA personnel in the field in Latin America has been increased by [redacted] in- cluding [redacted] officers under nonofficial cover. This makes a total of [redacted] officers in Latin America. A substantial additional number of officers under non-official cover will be assigned to the field during the coming year. Increased emphasis on the collection of intelligence information in Latin America during the past year has resulted in the activation of [redacted] additional clandestine sources of information. CIA now has [redacted] agents approved for use in Latin America - an increase of [redacted] in the past year. Penetrations of Communist Parties and Front Organizations in Latin America now number [redacted]

3. The recommendation of the Board. We recommend, while it is still possible, continued high-level and low-level (as required) aerial reconnaissance of Cuba as one means of acquiring photographic and signals intelligence concerning the military installations, the military forces, the modern military weaponry and the highly sophisticated communications facilities which the Soviets retain in Cuba. This surveillance effort must be accompanied by priority planning for the development of acceptable substitutes (such as drones, improved satellite reconnaissance, etc.) in lieu of present aerial reconnaissance coverage, when and if such coverage is denied us by air defense systems now being installed by the Soviets in Cuba on a scale matched only by Soviet air defense installations in the areas of Moscow and Leningrad. We also recommend the launching at the earliest possible date of a vigorous clandestine agent program to provide surreptitious collection of on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an essential supplement to aerial surveillance of the island.

Comment. We agree in general with this recommendation. High-level aerial reconnaissance of Cuba acquiring both photographic and signals intelligence concerning the military installation, the military forces, the modern military weaponry, and highly sophisticated communications facilities in Cuba is continuing. At present low-level reconnaissance is not included in the Cuban reconnaissance program. Authority will be sought for its use

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should a sufficiently suspicious objective of potentially offensive character be reported which cannot be covered by high altitude photography or other sources.

The United States Intelligence Board has approved SIGINT requirements for the use of a drone against Cuba when the circumstances require. A photographic drone capability exists and separate requirements for its use can be generated when necessary. This capability is now on a standby basis and could be activated within 10 days. Present satellite reconnaissance capabilities cannot provide the detailed information necessary for meeting our requirements in Cuba. Even though a decision were made to program a satellite for the southern latitudes, sacrificing the presently achievable resolution over priority targets in the USSR, it is felt that the results would not be satisfactory. The best resolution that might be obtained falls far short of the present requirement. The asset cannot be used on an "on-call" basis either in terms of launching or in terms of insuring that a pass will cover Cuba, and if it does that such pass could occur in satisfactory weather conditions. Whereas improved satellite performance is in the offing, these factors would still apply for the foreseeable future.

With regard to on-the-ground photography of targets in Cuba, as pointed out above we are vigorously attempting to infiltrate or recruit agents in Cuba. Selected agents will be provided photographic equipment. It should be realized, however, that the photographing of prime intelligence targets in a denied area, even with cleverly concealed cameras, is difficult.

4. The recommendation of the Board. We urge that without further delay a major clandestine agent effort be directed to the obtaining of vitally-needed signals intelligence available from the array of extraordinarily sophisticated communications equipment which is being installed and operated

Some of the systems already identified appear to be

and their permanent installation

The proximity to the United States of this communication equipment presents our intelligence collectors with

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that continued priority must be devoted to attacking this problem through our present and planned use of intercept and direction finding facilities employed at vantage points on land, in the air and at sea. In addition to such coverage we strongly recommend that: a) clandestine agent programs be devised and set in motion at once in Cuba, with a view to acquiring through surreptitious means, [REDACTED] 16

[REDACTED] and b) that steps be taken to ensure the readiness of commando-type or covert action plane and task forces as may be required for the pre-emption of Soviet communication sites and encryption machines in the event that opportunities for such action should be provided under circumstances of successful internal revolt or invasion.

Comment. The collection of Signals Intelligence from within Cuba has been under way for some time. [REDACTED] 16

[REDACTED] and it has not yet been possible to identify their precise location, through either electronic or agent means. Arrangements are now underway which may enable NSA to provide the Clandestine Services with considerably more accurate supplementary D/F results. An airborne D/F "homing" technique will be utilized to attempt to pinpoint the locations of transmitters [REDACTED] 11

The first target mission is now scheduled for approximately February 1, 1963. Under most favorable conditions, however, it is not anticipated that this effort would yield position accuracy of better than [REDACTED] Further refinement 16

of such results would be dependent upon a clandestine close-in effort to determine the exact locations where the devices are being used. There is no information available to indicate that these installations are "permanent", although there is no doubt, as of this date, that they are [REDACTED] 16

Without question, [REDACTED] are not permitted access to the areas in which the machines are located nor are [REDACTED] being trained in the use of the machines. The identification of the more sophisticated equipments comes from Signals Intelligence, and the variety of agent sources available to us in Cuba has not reported on any aspect of this equipment, indicating that the 08

[REDACTED] with whom our agents are in touch are not aware of the nature of the [REDACTED] 16

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16 In view of the lack of information noted above, the clandestine effort against Soviet COMINT in Cuba must consist of (a) first attempting to locate the [REDACTED] themselves, and (b) devising possible means of access to the [REDACTED]. CIA is currently reviewing all possible locations in Cuba where [REDACTED] may possibly be located in an effort to develop target data on each location, including terrain, security factors, order of battle of Soviet units, and personalities on each possible installation. In the absence of adequate D/Fing and with the lack of information on the location of the [REDACTED], we cannot be too sanguine about locating the target installation with sufficient accuracy to devise ways and means of creating a feasible operational situation within any scheduled phasing. Every effort is being made, however, to develop more precise targeting data. These efforts to locate the targets and to identify the facilities and agents who may eventually be used, have been given the highest priority.

The Board's recommendation that there be available commando-type or covert action plans and task forces to take advantage of an internal revolt or an invasion has been the subject of past and present planning and preparation by CIA, and discussions have been held with NSA concerning the best means of achieving this end. These discussions will continue with NSA and with DOD with the objective of creating the needed stand-by facility and incorporating it into the appropriate military plans with specific assignment of responsibilities. In addition, CIA has in being externally held assets which can be utilized for a commando-raid operation, in the event of a

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significant internal uprising. Without the precise location of the [REDACTED] however, even at such a time it will be difficult to target the commando raid with any assurances of success. It must be borne in mind, however, that any such direct action, short of open U. S. military invasion, is likely to lead to Soviet reprisals in one form or another against sophisticated U. S. communications equipments. The Soviets will probably, in such event, not be hampered by as many considerations as would the U. S., should this lead to a chain reaction on the part of the Soviets. At the same time, the intelligence value of the equipments obtained must be constantly reviewed if the information is to be obtained by other than surreptitious means.

In sum, therefore, this is a problem with which the intelligence community has long been troubled. There are no panaceas, and even though the location of the equipment, for the first time so close to U. S. shores, seems, therefore, to make it appear easier to obtain the required intelligence, the facts of the matter are to the contrary in that the Soviets are still maintaining full and complete control over the equipment just as they have done in the past in more contiguous areas to the Soviet Union.

5. The recommendation of the Board. In instances where exceptional intelligence collection techniques involving unusual risks are proposed to meet priority intelligence objectives and their use is opposed on ground that elements of risk are present, the matter should be referred to the Presidential level for final decision. We recommend this procedure because our Government may well be faced with the necessity of assuming increasing risks if we are to acquire a firm intelligence basis for estimating present and future Soviet capabilities and intentions in Cuba and in other potential trouble spots.

Comment. We concur in this recommendation. We assume that term "Presidential level" means the President.

6. The recommendation of the Board. In view of evidence from Cuba that the Soviets are resorting to use of camouflage of missile installations, we recommend that the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) assign a high priority to experiments, under controlled conditions, to determine the effectiveness of short and long range photography against various types of camouflage and concealment of photographic targets. We believe that new sensing and illumination methods may now be available which would be of assistance in reaching a solution of this critical problem.

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Comment: We agree. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance already has recommended the use of [REDACTED] film in reconnaissance of Cuba. This has never been tried so the COMOR has requested that tests be made of the available [REDACTED] film and that the results be reported to COMOR in order that it may be aware of the full nature of the capability should requirements indicate a need for its use. In addition, the Committee has requested a briefing by the Joint Reconnaissance Center on the full range of [REDACTED] photography both low- and high-altitude so that it may be fully aware of the assets available to meet requirements.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

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